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COMMENTS ON THE ALBERTA
PIPELINE SAFETY REVIEW 
Jennifer Winter†
SUMMARY
The release last month of the Alberta Pipeline Safety Review was meant to be a symbol of
the province’s renewed commitment to environmental responsibility as it aims for new export
markets. The report’s authors, Group 10 Engineering, submitted 17 recommendations
covering public safety and pipeline incidents, pipeline integrity management and pipeline
safety near bodies of water — and many of them run the gamut from the obvious to the
unhelpful to the contradictory. That the energy regulator ought to be staffed to do its job
should go without saying; in fact, staffing levels were never identified as an issue. The
recommendation that record retention and transfer requirements be defined for mergers
and acquisitions, sales and takeovers is moot. There is no reason a purchasing party would
not want all relevant documents, and no real way to enforce transparency if the seller opts
to withhold information. Harmonizing regulations between provinces could reduce
companies’ cost of doing business, but could also prove challenging if different jurisdictions
use performance-based regulations — which is what the Review recommended Alberta
consider. This very brief paper pries apart the Review’s flaws and recommends that the
province go back to the drawing board. Safety is a serious issue; a genuine statistical review
linking pipeline characteristics to failures and risk-mitigation activities would be a better
alternative by far. 
† Thanks to Michal Moore, Andrew Wilkins and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments.
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Pipeline safety is an issue throughout the world, reflecting an apparent increase in the
frequency of accidents, recognition of system age and vulnerabilities, and increased media
attention. In Alberta, Group 10 Engineering was engaged as an independent third party by the
Energy Resources Conservation Board (now the Alberta Energy Regulator) to review pipeline
safety in Alberta. Their report is available at
http://www.energy.alberta.ca/Org/pdfs/PSRfinalReportNoApp.pdf. The purpose of the report
was to assess current regulatory requirements and industry best practices related to public
safety and pipeline incidents, pipeline integrity management, and the safety of pipelines near
bodies of water. The Group 10 Engineering report was released to the public on August 23,
2013. The focus of the report was comparing Alberta’s regulatory framework to the
frameworks of other jurisdictions. The report outlined 17 recommendations for improving
pipeline safety. 
The purpose of this communiqué is to review and comment on the practicality and feasibility
of 13 of the 17 recommendations. The recommendations are reviewed in the order they appear
in the Alberta Pipeline Safety Review.1
In general, the recommendations are superficial and of little practical use for improving
pipeline safety in Alberta. In some cases, unintended consequences from the recommendations
may compromise pipeline safety. This is a serious policy concern, as time is of the essence and
scarce public funds must be directed and spent judiciously in order to maintain public health
and safety. A review of the key flaws includes:
PUBLIC SAFETY AND RESPONSE TO PIPELINE INCIDENTS
Recommendation #1: Regulators and licensees could jointly develop a stakeholder
education/awareness program on the consequences of right-of-way encroachment and how to react in
the event of an emergency.
The definition of stakeholder matters in energy system operations and oversight. There are
many potential stakeholders, each with a different role and responsibility, and any
recommendation should be clear on who the stakeholders are. Pipeline and facility
licensees are required to have emergency response plans (vetted by the regulator), and so,
additional education likely has little value to them. 
If one stakeholder considered is the general public,2 then there may be some value in
additional education. A major consequence of right-of-way encroachment is pipeline
rupture, which the majority of individuals undoubtedly appreciate. However, the public is
not likely to understand or appreciate the level of risk associated with encroachment. There
is currently a substantial amount of promotion of the Alberta One Call system, which
focuses on prevention, so it is not clear if additional educational programming is required. 
1 I refrain from commenting on the recommendations regarding the safety of pipelines near water, as they are more
technical in nature and are direct recommendations for changing Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) regulations.
2 The Alberta Energy Regulator does not have a definition of what a stakeholder is, but the Alberta government
identified stakeholder groups as: environmental non-governmental organizations, landowners and groups representing
landowners, municipalities, the oil, gas and oil sands industries, and the coal industry. See various documents from
the Regulatory Enhancement Task Force.
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Recommendation #2: The Call Before You Dig (Alberta 1 Call) membership requirement is
legislated as compulsory in Alberta for pipeline licensees; but this is not the case nationally.
Consideration should be given to instituting this as a Canada wide program. Not only would this
benefit other jurisdictions where it is not a requirement, but it would also ensure that new
Albertans are consistently aware of these requirements.
The Alberta One Call system is aimed at the prevention of pipeline damage by educating
homeowners and contractors, as well as by providing information on the location of buried
utilities prior to ground disturbances. Membership makes it mandatory to provide sufficient
information to anyone undertaking a ground disturbance. As the program already exists in
Alberta, making a call-before-you-dig program mandatory nationally would have a
minimal effect on pipeline safety in Alberta.
Recommendation #3: ERCB staff should consider increased participation in stakeholder hosted
emergency response exercises, as these present an opportunity to share knowledge as well as
provide an opportunity to the regulatory staff to informally review ERP [emergency response plan]
documents and processes.
The Alberta Energy Regulator’s Directive 071 outlines emergency preparedness and
response requirements for industry. There is also an overview of the AER’s emergency
response plan, which includes suggestions for industry to improve their emergency
response. As well, licensees must submit their emergency response plans for approval by
the AER, and will need to address any outstanding concerns before approval occurs.3
Additional input by regulatory staff simply does not add to or improve public safety and
may encourage a false complacency. Moreover, informal input brings the risk of
miscommunication, as well as compromising safety.
PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT
Recommendation #1: Institute the risk ranking of all pipelines based on standardized methodology
to be developed by Canadian regulators and stakeholders.
While an inventory of pipelines is a useful tool for the AER, it is not clear a risk ranking of
pipelines provides a benefit, unless it supports a broad enforceable program of
remediation. A more useful tool is a predefined threshold for pipeline safety that should be
stringently regulated and enforced. If all pipelines are above the safety threshold, they are,
by definition, not risky, or at least satisfy the principle of keeping risk as low as reasonably
practicable.4 If pipelines are below the threshold, then the regulator should address these
deficiencies through enforcement actions. 
3 See Appendix 2: ERP Approval Application in “Directive 071: Emergency Preparedness and Response Requirements
for the Petroleum Industry,” http://www.aer.ca/rules-and-regulations/directives/directive-071 (viewed August 28,
2013).
4 Though there is an argument for different risk tolerances depending on location and the product transported via
pipeline.
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Facilities regulated by the AER are already audited, and audits are prioritized by operator
(licensee/contractor) history, sensitivity of the location, and the inherent risk of the project
or operation.5 It is not clear how a risk ranking would enhance the AER’s (or any other
regulator’s) ability to regulate pipeline safety. Requiring this ranking would certainly
demand additional resources and may create confusion among other stakeholders and the
public at large.
Recommendation #2: Integrity Management Programs for all companies under the ERCBs
jurisdiction should be audited on a routine basis for compliance with respect to adequacy,
implementation and effectiveness. Given the number of licensees in Alberta, this is potentially a
near impossible task for the ERCB to achieve on its own. Consideration should be given to
accepting self or third party audits from licensees; complemented by random and risk assessed
requirements for ERCB led audits (which could vary in intensity or focus as required).
This recommendation is suggesting, without saying it explicitly, that there are not enough
audits, but the AER cannot feasibly perform all the audits. The challenge is to strike a
balance between self-enforcement of standards by pipeline companies and ensuring
standards are met via audits by the regulator. The issue of industry self-governance can be
contentious, especially in industries where public health and safety is an issue and public
trust may be strained.
For the operators or licensees of pipelines, there are major financial penalties from
ruptures: the cost of cleanup, the cost of shutting a pipeline down, and whatever
enforcement penalties are applied. Even non-compliance carries financial penalties. There
is also the associated loss of public trust and a tarnished corporate image. These costs
create the financial incentive to maintain pipeline safety, combined with standards
prescribed by the regulator. That said, there may be short-term gains to firms from
compromising safety.
Third-party and government audits should be indistinguishable from each other, as they are
both via an independent third party. The monies spent on third-party audits could just as
easily be used to increase staff at the regulator (regardless of who was paying for the
audit), but so long as independence is maintained, third-party audits would be sufficient for
evidence of compliance. The benefits of self-auditing should already be captured in
mandatory activities to ensure compliance. Firms should already be self-auditing in order
to ensure their integrity management programs meet the requisite standards set by the
regulator. To ensure compliance or to verify the results of self-audits, the regulator would
still need to conduct its own audits. As a result, implementing the recommendation would
likely not improve pipeline safety.
5
“Inspections and Audits,” Alberta Energy Regulator, http://www.aer.ca/compliance-and-enforcement/inspections-and-
audits, (viewed August 27, 2013).
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Recommendation #3: Set minimum requirements for comprehensive inspection and testing
programs for pipelines to establish the current condition of pipelines in assessed high-risk areas
as identified in recommendation 1 above.
Minimum safety standards should be sufficient to ensure pipeline safety throughout the
system, including high-risk areas. As stated in Directive 066, “compliance in meeting or
exceeding regulations and standards is the responsibility of the energy industry. The ERCB
expects all industry participants to understand its requirements and have an infrastructure
in place to ensure compliance.”6 The regulator outlines requirements for maintaining
pipeline safety. Beyond that, it is the responsibility of operators and licensees to engage in
behaviour to meet the minimum requirements. Unless the minimum standards are
inadequate, additional requirements will provide no additional benefit.
Recommendation #4: Work with appropriate education or industry institutions to develop
certification programs for individuals (operators, construction and integrity inspectors and
supervisors) in the areas of pipeline safety, including construction, operation, inspection and
integrity management.
A lack of training, either in regulator employees or industry employees, was not identified
as an issue by the report. Moreover, both energy regulators and energy facility licensees
and operators have every incentive to hire and retain adequately trained individuals in
these areas. For regulators, the public relies on them to adequately inspect energy facilities.
The loss of public trust following a rupture of a just-inspected pipeline would be
substantial. Presumably, current employees of the regulator and the operators and licensees
are adequately trained. 
Developing certification programs creates two issues. The first is that adequate inspection
will be dependent on having certified employees within the regulator and within the
company. This will create an artificial supply constraint on the number of inspectors, and
in a worst-case scenario, lead to fewer inspections. This recommendation could actually
decrease pipeline safety. The second issue is that certificate programs add on a layer of
needless requirements for adequate training — it is in the best interests of both firms and
regulators to have the best possible staff. 
6 Alberta Energy Regulator, “Directive 066: Requirements and Procedures for Pipelines”
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Recommendation #5: Where appropriate the ERCB should consider using performance-based
regulation for those licensees whose performance warrants such an approach (this approach is
used by the pressure equipment regulator in Alberta and is the trend among major regulators such
as PHMSA and in the EU). This process should be evolutionary with compliance audits providing
the necessary confidence for the transition to a performance-based system.
Regulators can direct the behaviour of those they govern in two basic ways. Prescriptive
regulation involves the regulator prescribing the actions required for the regulated entity to
improve their performance. Performance-based (or goal-based) regulation states the
desired goal or level of performance, and allows the targets of regulation to decide how to
achieve that level.7 The report provides no evidence in support of performance-based
regulation improving safety compared to prescriptive regulation. Without evidence, it is
impossible to validate the benefit of changing the regulatory structure, which would
certainly carry considerable costs.
Additionally, the way the report authors compared Alberta to other jurisdictions was an
assessment and comparison of regulatory provisions beyond those prescribed by the CSA
Z662 standards. Using this methodology, the more additional regulations a jurisdiction has,
the better it ranks in the report. Moving from prescriptive regulation to performance-based
regulation would decrease the number of regulations faced by firms in Alberta. If the
authors believe that performance-based recommendation is a substitute for prescriptive
regulation, then their chosen methodology to compare jurisdictions is incorrect.
Recommendation #6: ERCB should be staffed appropriately to manage and enforce regulations
(whether prescriptive or performance based) to ensure pipeline safety and integrity.
It goes without saying that any regulator should be staffed appropriately to fulfill their
mandate. As neither the level of staffing at the ERCB, nor the ability of the ERCB to
adequately “manage and enforce regulations,” were identified as issues by the G10 report,
this recommendation is a) obvious and b) not helpful.
Recommendation #7: ERCB should work collaboratively with stakeholders to set clear goals and
objectives to focus and manage the reduction of pipeline failures to a level as low as reasonably
practicable (ALARP).
The Alberta Energy Regulator provides the enabling Act, along with Regulations,
Directives and Bulletins on its website. Together, these set out the minimum safety
standards for operating pipelines in Alberta. The goal for firms operating pipelines is to
meet or exceed these standards. As none of the standards were identified by the report as
inadequate, this recommendation does little more than state the obvious.
7 For an overview of advantages and disadvantages of the two types of regulation, see Coglianese, Cary; Nash,
Jennifer; Olmstead, Todd, (2003) “Performance-Based Regulation: Prospects and Limitations in Health, Safety, and
Environmental Protection,” Administrative Law Review 55 (1) p. 705 
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Recommendation #8: Record retention and transfer requirements, specifically during takeovers,
mergers, acquisitions and sales, should be clearly defined in the regulation.
There is no reason a purchasing party would not want all relevant documentation for the
asset they are purchasing. Usually, sale contracts include a schedule of assets and
associated documentation. If the seller withheld information required to maintain a
minimum safety standard, they would certainly be considered partly responsible, if not
liable. Moreover, if companies for some reason do not transfer records, the only
knowledge of the records would lie with the seller. The buyer would have no way of
knowing these records exist, or retrieving them. Without evidence of incomplete records
due to a change in ownership leading to a pipeline rupture, there is no reason to create a
regulation that is, at best, ineffective and non-enforceable.
Recommendation #9: The ERCB should work with other regulators to harmonize regulatory
requirements and support a consistent regulatory basis for stakeholders (for example the recently
stated key performance indicators required by the National Energy Board could be considered for
adoption by the ERCB). The use of a standard such as CSA Z662 is a valuable tool in promoting
harmonization.
Harmonizing regulatory requirements reduces the cost of doing business across
jurisdictions, making it a laudable policy goal. However, if the regulatory requirements
across jurisdictions are sufficient for a minimum safety standard — and there is no
evidence otherwise — harmonization is not a pipeline safety issue. Moreover,
harmonization is not necessarily viable if different jurisdictions are using performance-
based regulation. This recommendation is inconsistent with the above recommendation to
move to performance-based regulation.
Recommendation #10: Third party encroachment and pipeline interference is still a major concern
to licensees. Additional education of industries and the public as to the risks and regulatory
requirements of working near pipelines could be promoted. Some licensees stated the setback
requirements are inadequate for class 4 areas (where there is presently municipal development, or
a high future potential for municipal development).
The Alberta Energy Regulator’s report Pipeline Performance in Alberta, evaluates pipeline
performance between 1990 and 2012.8 In the report, “damage by others” is the fourth most
frequent cause of failures, accounting for 4.5 per cent of failures between 1990 and 2012.
However, when breaking down incidents by type of pipeline, damage by others is much
more frequent: 19.7 per cent for crude oil pipelines, 9.6 per cent for sour gas pipelines and
15.2 per cent for natural gas pipelines. That said, corrosion (internal and external) is still
the predominant cause of pipeline incidents. While prevention of damage by others is
certainly important, more work is required in prevention by pipeline licensees, which is
under the purview of the AER. This speaks to the need for improved inspections and
technology. Influencing the behaviour of individuals and contractors is beyond the scope
and ability of the AER. 
8 Alberta Energy Regulator Report 2013-B: “Pipeline Performance in Alberta, 1990-2012,”
http://www.aer.ca/documents/reports/R2013-B.pdf (viewed August 27, 2013).
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Conclusions and Recommendations
The 13 recommendations analyzed here unfortunately do little to address pipeline safety in
Alberta. While not all are flawed, many are weak and provide little guidance for the regulator
as to what steps should be taken to improve pipeline safety and public trust. The province
should strongly consider commissioning another report with broader scope. While the Group
10 report did assess the regulatory requirements in Alberta and compare these requirements to
other jurisdictions, a comparison of regulations does not adequately address the issue of
pipeline safety. What is required is a statistical review analyzing pipeline characteristics and
relating these to failures, inspections and other risk-mitigation activities. Facts about the
relationship between pipeline characteristics (age, material) and the risk of failure are what are
needed to improve pipeline safety and restore public trust.
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